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8    Citizens’ Complaints and Police 
  (Un)accountability: The Career of a Parisian 
  Commissaire de Police of the Belle Époque. 
Anja Johansen 
Citizens’ complaints provide fascinating insights into deviant behaviour among police 
personnel and how police managers deal with allegations of police malpractice. They 
also highlight the permeable boundaries between legality and illegality surrounding the 
actions of police personnel. Persistent allegations and evidence of police wrong-doing 
suggest that police often benefit from impunity when violating citizens’ rights and 
breaching legal boundaries. Deviant police officers present police chiefs with the 
managerial dilemma of either disciplining the erring officer – and thereby implicitly or 
explicitly admit fault on the part of the police organisation – or justifying or denying the 
acts of the policeman with the risk of alienating the complainant, and perhaps the wider 
community. 
This chapter investigates these ambiguities through a micro-study of the dubious 
professional record of one particularly deviant Parisian Commisssaire de Police, Léon 
Alexandre Kien, who was the object of persistent complaints and numerous 
disciplinary investigations between 1897 and 1918. Kien’s well-documented career 
provides rare insights into citizens’ grievances against police malpractice, as well as 
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the functioning of disciplinary procedures within Paris’ police and the handling of 
problem officers by successive police prefects. This micro-history serves as prism to 
reflect much broader aspect of police-public relations, which are otherwise difficult to 
study and contextualize due to limited documentation. 
 
Improving the relationship with the public first emerged as a concern within the Paris 
police by the late nineteenth century, when Police Prefect Lépine sought to raise 
professional standards and increase the prestige of the force among the population. 
However, no formalised complaints procedures were developed, as this would 
inevitably commit the police chiefs to engage with the criticism from citizens. So while 
complaints procedures became part of the legitimising police rhetoric in other 
European countries – no matter how remote from the actual reality – the Paris police 
remained seemingly impenetrable to citizens’ grievances about police malpractice.  
 
The Paris police force of the Third Republic has had a very mixed press: voices from 
the left-liberal and socialist camp scorned the Paris police in the 1870s and 1880s for 
poor professional standards, for not respecting citizens’ rights and for allowing 
personnel with anti-Republican Bonapartist sympathies to run riot against political 
activists on the republican and socialist left.1 From the 1890s, voices appeared from 
the far-right, who complained about police corruption and politically motivated police 
attacks on their supporters.2 Allegations as well as major scandals showing brutal or 
illegal policing practices continued to affect the reputation of the Paris police force 
through the interwar years and the Nazi occupation into the 1960s with bloody crack-
down on Algerians and student protesters.3 These episodes of police malpractice 
added to what Berlière and Lévy recently described as ‘the weight of history’, by further 
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feeding a ‘black legend’ of conspiracy theories and allegations of systematic police 
violence and corruption.4  
 
The main narrative by French historians has vacillated between highly critical 
assessments of policing in times of conflict, and sympathetic, sometimes apologetic, 
justifications of successive Republican governments, who repeatedly closed their eyes 
for malpractice and justified a system whereby police forces had almost no direct 
accountability towards the citizens. This is often explained by the Third Republic’s 
need to ensure loyalty from the police, the gendarmerie and the army. Successive 
interior ministers therefore carefully avoided conflicts with the Paris police, responsible 
as it was for the security of all key republican institutions.5 As a result, dubious policing 
practices were tolerated and police managers were allowed to exercise internal 
organisational discipline without much interference from government and judiciary.  
 
It was only from the 1990s, when police scholars and historians began to look closely 
at the Paris police force, that the basis was created for a better understanding of the 
practices of the police prefecture in a wider context. The research by Jean-Marc 
Berlière as well as a younger generation of police scholars has done much to counter 
the ‘black legend’ of French – and notably Parisian – policing of the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries.6 Berlière in particular has insisted on the gradual improvement of 
policing standards (better education, professionalization, and discipline) during the 
twenty-year period from 1893 to 1913, when Lépine headed the Paris police 
prefecture. That the Paris police force got more professional and disciplined is 
undoubtedly true. However Lépine was caught between his managerial concerns for 
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professionalism and discipline on the one hand and, on the other, his insistence on 
never publicly admitting fault on the part of the police. 
 
The micro-study of Commissaire Kien’s professional conduct – at the edge and 
sometimes beyond the law – reflects important aspects around crime and deviance 
among police personnel. It highlights that it was not just Kien’s unacceptable 
behaviour, but also the official police denial, that alienated and frustrated Parisians, 
even stout republicans and natural supporters of law and order.  
 
Modern research on police deviance provides a useful framework by which to assess 
and contextualize Kien’s professional conduct and the reluctance of Lépine to 
seriously discipline his persistent malpractice. Gottschalk distinguishes between three 
types of transgressive behaviour.7 At the most serious end is actual criminal activity 
(corruption for personal gain, theft from a crime scene, involvement in organised crime, 
homicide or violent assault where the policeman’s profession is incidental to the act). 
These should be distinguished from what he terms ‘functional misconduct’ i.e. 
breaches of the articles in the Penal Code which are specifically related to the 
professional functions and powers of the policeman (abuse of authority, excessive 
violence against prisoners or members of the public, evidence manipulation and 
perjury, unauthorised disclosure of information).8 Because these breaches are often – 
although not always – committed in order to achieve efficient law enforcement and 
crime fighting, such behaviour is the least likely to be sanctioned by police managers 
as they are often justified with reference to ‘effective policing’. At the least serious end 
of the spectrum, Gottschalk identifies what could be termed police ‘occupational 
deviance’ (sleeping, drinking, absenteeism), which are breaches of disciplinary rules, 
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but only occasionally criminal.9 The allegations against Kien fall within all three 
categories, although only the ‘functional misconduct’ and the ‘occupational deviance’ 
were substantiated by the disciplinary investigations. It is also worth noting that none 
of his transgressive behaviour promoted effective crime fighting or order-maintenance.  
 
Kien’s case illustrates two important features of police non-accountability of the early 
twentieth century. In the first place, it shows how a persistent offender against 
procedures, legal boundaries, professionalism and good policing practice was allowed 
to occupy the position as police station master despite a lengthy trail of complaints 
and disciplinary investigations. The other feature is how in France, concerns from 
members of the public were left in a procedural limbo a long time after other European 
countries, like Britain or Prussia, had established formal procedures for the handling 
of citizens’ complaints.  
 
The micro-history of Kien’s catalogue of malpractice allows unique insights into how 
citizens’ complaints were handled within the Paris police prefecture. The following 
analysis looks at the complaints raised against Kien (II), the problems arising from 
inadequate complaints procedures (III), the handling of complaints against Kien by the 
internal disciplinary body (IV), and the culture of patronage within the police which may 









A recent study into offending police officers in the London Metropolitan Police of the 
twenty-first century makes two observations which are relevant to contextualising Kien 
as a deviant police officer: That a small proportion of individuals account for the major 
proportion of deviant behaviour and that, most often, police managers are aware of 
who the ‘problem officers’ are.10 The features that characterise ‘problem officers’ are 
i) early onset of offending behaviour; ii) late desistance i.e. at what stage the officer 
ceases to cause a disciplinary problems; iii) frequency of offending behaviour; and iv) 
length of career.11 In all respects, Kien’s disciplinary record identifies him as a ‘problem 
officer’. Yet, despite being the object of numerous complaints and allegations of 
serious misconduct, he was consistently promoted and ended his career as 
commissaire classe exceptionnelle and retired with full pension. Moreover, it is clear 
that Police Prefect Lépine was aware of Kien’s disciplinary problems as early as 1897, 
if not before.  
 
From his personnel file, which is kept in the Archives of the Paris Police Prefecture, 
we can follow Kien’s background and professional progress.12 He was born in 1863, 
the son of an ex-brigardier and a mother who had been a domestic servant.13 Kien’s 
educational attainment of a baccalauréat (secondary school diploma) identifies him as 
(lower) middle-class and allowed him to join the Paris police at clerical level as 
secrétaire suppléant (assistant clerk).14 Kien therefore never occupied the lower ranks 
as street police, nor did he have any background in the army beyond the compulsory 
military service, unlike most of the men recruited for the lower ranks. Instead, the 
position as secrétaire suppléant (assistant clerk) functioned as practical training for 
men who would proceed to managerial posts at the middle or upper ranks of the police 
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hierarchy.15 Kien joined the police in 1888,16 five years before Lépine became police 
prefect of Paris. His recruitment was therefore not subjected to the same stringent 
scrutiny as later candidates,17 but all his promotions happened under Lépine. Over the 
following seven years he fulfilled secretarial functions at six Parisian police stations, 
before being promoted from 1895 to commissaire in several municipal forces just 
outside Paris. These posts functioned as springboard for his applications to three 
successive posts as commissaire at police stations under the Paris police prefecture 
between 1901 and 1918.18  
 
As commissaire, Kien was the head of one of the eighty Parisian police stations19 with 
managerial responsibility for a staff typically including one clerk, a secrétaire suppléant 
(assistant clerk), as well as a number of inspecteurs and gardiens de la paix (police 
constables).20 In addition to his managerial role, his core functions were judicial, as he 
fulfilled many of the traditional functions of a juge de paix (roughly equivalent to a 
justice of peace) alongside administrative responsibilities for record-keeping and 
accountancy within the police station.21 The post gave him status as fonctionnaire (civil 
servant) which, among other advantages, gave him a particularly protected position 
against legal challenges from members of the public. Within the Republican hierarchy, 
the post was considered sufficiently senior for his names to appear in the Almanach 
national, which listed all the occupants of leading official positions in the French 
Republic. We can see from Kien’s activities that as commissaire he was involved in 
crime fighting and law enforcement according to his own discretion. The complaints 
against him were not related to him appearing at the home of suspected criminals 
alongside detectives or his involvement in fist-fights with anarchists, as this was 
perfectly within his remit. Yet, while Kien was in a position to largely define which police 
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functions he would take active part in, he showed great ignorance or contempt for legal 
boundaries and procedures during such interventions.  
 
Early evidence of serious problems surrounding Kien dates from 1897, with a letter of 
complaint from a group of middle-class citizens of Asnière, alleging that Kien had 
criminal connections.22 We have no way of knowing whether this was the beginning of 
his professional misconduct, or whether previously allegations of dubious connections 
and disrespect of legal boundaries had simply been ignored by his superiors and 
tolerated as ‘normal’. However, by the turn of the century his professional conduct 
looked increasingly deviant: it was obviously considered unacceptable by members of 
the public and his superiors began to take notice. Between 1897 and his retirement in 
1918, he managed to clock up at least seventeen disciplinary investigations – although 
because of the inconsistent recording of such cases, it is possible that there were 
more.  
 
Kien comes across as the stereotypical ill-behaved Parisian commissaire, almost to 
the level of caricature, as described by Yves Guyot23 and later by Ernest Raynaud24 
for the 1880s: a rough, often semi-illiterate, former soldier of low social origins and 
professionally socialised into his police function under the Second Empire. Such 
characters were supposed to have been weeded out by Lépine’s introduction of higher 
professional standards, stricter disciplinary procedures, and more rigorous recruitment 
criteria. The raising of standards among the rank and file as well as amongst station 
masters was a managerial priority not only for Lépine but amongst police chiefs across 
France. Thus, Commissiare Pelantant from Grenoble most specifically emphasised 
high expectations to moral and professional conduct from police managers as role 
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models for their subordinates.25 Contemporary observers as well as historians agree 
that, by the first decade of the twentieth century, standards had improved considerably 
in all ranks.26 Berlière also cites the decline in the annual number of dismissals and 
resignations between the 1870s and the 1890s as evidence of real improvement in 
quality of personnel.27  
 
The disciplinary record of Commissaire Kien throws some doubts both over the actual 
achievements, as well as over the root causes of ill-behaved police officers. While 
many of the behavioural problems of rudeness and brutality were presumed to stem 
from low levels of formal education and low social origins28 no such excuse could be 
made for Kien. Unlike the caricature of the commissaire of the 1880s, Kien did not lack 
education. Rather, with his baccalauréat diploma, he was considered ‘educated’. Nor 
can the multiple complaints about his vulgar and often violent behaviour towards 
members of the public be explained as caused by growing up amongst the rough and 
ignorant. Instead we can suggest that a combination of his personality, the extensive 
powers he enjoyed as head of a police station, as well as the lack of any meaningful 
consequences emerging from the multiple disciplinary investigations against him, 
gave little incentive for him to change his professional style. Despite Kien’s 
professional and personal shortcomings being well-known to Lépine, this old 
disciplinarian vehemently defended his man against any outside criticism, and it was 
only after Lépine’s retirement in 1913 that Kien began to face serious consequences 
for his professional conduct. We will address the probable reasons for this staunch 





Another question emerging from Kien’s dubious professional record is why it proved 
almost impossible for complainants to obtain any form of redress or acknowledgement 
of fault against the Parisian police?  Kien’s behaviour may have been  grudgingly 
tolerated in the 1880s. However, by the turn of the century, with rising popular 
expectations to police professionalism, Kien’s behaviour was increasingly perceived 
as  intolerable, not only by the public but increasingly also among his superiors.  
 
The collection of complaints and investigations against Kien are key to our 
understanding of the power relations between an ill-behaved police commissaire and 
frustrated members of the public, as it gives us unique insights into how complaints 
against the Paris police force were handled within the organisation. The 
documentation about citizens’ complaints against the Paris police is limited, and the 
complaints and investigations against Kien constitute by far the best documented 
against any individual police officer. The majority of complaints cases appear in 
personnel files, while an additional 180 cases are filed in two dossiers covering the 
years 1896-1911.29 It is not clear why these cases have been filed separately, and we 
have no way of knowing how representative these cases are. The first dossier, starting 
in 1896, contains only complaints against the commissiares in Parisian police stations. 
The dossier starting in 1907 on the other hand, includes complaints against all 
personnel at Parisian police stations. This suggests that while managerial control of 
the lower ranks had previously been left to the commissaire at local police stations, 





Seen from the perspective of ordinary Parisians, complaining against the police was 
a tortuous process, with limited prospect of any tangible outcome, and with the added 
risk that a complaint against a local police employee might create a lot of trouble for 
the complainant. The fact that many of the allegations were made anonymously reflect 
the fear of consequnces that complainants might legitimately have experienced. 
Nevertheless, the documents relating to Kien and citizens’ complaints against other 
officers also reveal that Parisians from all creeds and casts voiced their dissatisfaction. 
Well-connected members of the social and political elites as well as ordinary people 
with no connections or protection complained about the police.30  
 
The complaint narratives cover a range of allegations. There are some expressing 
concerns about disciplinary failings (non-intervention against criminals, policemen 
being drunk on duty or absent from duty and/or sloppiness in professional standards). 
The vast majority of complaints though refer to behaviour that was perceived to be 
‘unacceptable’ by both the complainant and often the wider public, if one is to believe 
the reporting of individual cases in the press. Although not strictly in breach of formal 
rules, the complaints against Kien of rough and impolite police behaviour were typical. 
Such police behaviour violated the ever rising popular expectations that policemen 
should be forthcoming and respectful, while rigorously observing procedures and legal 
boundaries, particularly where the rights of citizens were at stake. Finally, a substantial 
number of complaints contain allegations of breaches of the paragraphs in the Penal 
Code which placed restriction on police behaviour in relation to members of the public 
(excessive violence, breach of legal boundaries, illegal arrests, perjury, corruption or 
allegations of involvement in criminality). The complaints against Kien are thereby 
typical for complaints in general, but the seriousness of Kien’s behaviour and the 
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persistence of complaints across two decades marks him out as unusual. What is 
particularly noticeable is the disconnect between what members of the public saw as 
‘problematic’ and what police chiefs seemed to perceive as ‘problematic’ police 
behaviour. As complainants had few means to force police chiefs to act upon 
complaints, or even register them formally, there was very limited space for meaningful 
conversation between aggrieved citizens and police authorities.   
 
By the turn of the twentieth century, a new player appeared on the scene in the form 
of the Ligue des droits de l’homme (The League of Human Rights, hereafter LDH). 
This civil rights organisation was formed in 1898 on the basis of networks built up over 
the previous years in support of Captain Alfred Dreyfus.31 Within the first two years of 
its existence, the LDH grew to become a mass organisation with considerable financial 
muscle enabling it to engage in individual complaints against any public authority. The 
LDH provided an extremely influential, informed and well-connected ally for aggrieved 
citizens, and quite a few of the high profile complaints cases from after 1903 were 
supported by the LDH. These included at least two cases against Kien, as we shall 
see below. This gave complainants access not only to first-class legal advice, but also 
to publicity for their case, both in LDH’s bi-monthly newsletter for members and also 
in the wider public media, because major Parisian newspapers such as L’Aurore, Le 
Temps, Le Siècle, La Lanterne and L’Humanité had close links to leading members of 
the LDH. Yet, even with its considerable resources and leading members among the 
political, judicial and media elites, the LDH had difficulties getting very far with actual 




One key problem in this respect, was the absence of any concept of ‘citizens’ 
complaints’ against the police in French law or procedural practice. In legal terms then, 
it was only possible for members of the public to challenge the police with two very 
specific types of complaints. A case could be presented before the administrative 
courts if an individual could establish a legal claim that questioned or overrode a 
specific police decision or act. Such cases typically concerned requests for individuals 
being except from general rules or compensation claims for loss or damages caused 
by police actions or non-actions. The other type of complaint from the public that was 
recognised in law was alleged breaches of the Penal Code, specifically the paragraphs 
concerning illegal arrest, abuse of power, or perjury. Such complaints could – in 
principles at least – be raised with the public prosecutor and if substantiated, be tried 
at the criminal tribunals. In practice, however, it was almost impossible to bring a 
criminal prosecution against police personnel for such offences, as we will see. In 
addition to administrative challenges and criminal allegation, members of the public 
could also notify the police authorities about police personnel failing in relation to 
disciplinary matters.  
 
The consequence of the structuring of complaints against the police exclusively 
around administrative claims, and allegations of breaches of criminal and disciplinary 
codes was that any complaint which did not fit into these three categories fell into a 
legal-procedural void. There were no rules or procedural framework around 
‘behavioural complaints’. For instance, it was not stated that citizens had the right to 
complain, nor did any rules or procedures exist for how the authorities were supposed 
to process ‘behavioural complaints’. By the late nineteenth century, this institutional 
deficiency distinguished the French system from other European countries. The 
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London Metropolitan police pioneered the first formal citizens’ complaints scheme for 
the handling of ‘behavioural complaints’ by 1831.33 Similar procedures were later 
extended to country and borough police across Britain.34 In Prussia, the 1883 
legislation on regional administration established formal complaints procedures 
relating to police behaviour alongside procedures for complaints against other public 
authorities.35  
 
In nineteenth century France, some elements of a ‘police complaints system’ did exist 
in the sense that members of the public could not be prevented from expressing their 
grievances. People complained verbally at the local police station or sent letters of 
complaint to local police chiefs, to the Paris police prefect, to the interior minister, or 
to any person with some influence within the establishment who might bring the 
complaint to the attention of the relevant police authority. According to Guyot, the 
Parisians of the 1880s complained all the time, but the police just took no notice.36 The 
micro-history on Kien’s career reveal that by the turn of the century, at least the Paris 
police prefecture began to do just that.  
 
In the absence of a formalised complaints procedure, historians rely on the micro-
study of individuals as these provide a rare window into how the police handled 
complaints from members of the public. The micro-study of cases against Kien and 
other senior police personnel reveal that the internal police disciplinary body, the 
contrôle général, came to play a central role in investigations and decision-making. 
Indeed, many of the complaints dossiers include investigative reports from the contrôle 
général. We can see that some complaints were addressed either directly to the police 
prefect while many were forwarded to the police prefect from other recipients. Most 
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importantly, these cases reveal that allegations about criminal acts which 
complainants sent directly to le procureur de la république (the public prosecutor), and 
which should have been investigated by the prosecution authorities, were often 
forwarded without prior investigation to the police prefect to be investigated by the 
contrôle général. This transfer of criminal allegations for arbitrary arrest, misuse of 
power, excessive violence and perjury committed by police personnel from the 
procureur to the contrôle général, meant that such allegations were handled as 
disciplinary matters rather than criminal acts. This helps to explain why French courts 
only played a very minor role in keeping Parisian policemen to account. It was far more 
difficult in the French system to bring a civil or criminal prosecution against serving 
police officers than in Prussia or Britain, although in neither of these jurisdictions was 
prosecution of police personnel by any means an easy process.37 In Paris, 
investigations of all types (criminal acts, disciplinary issues and behavioural 
complaints) all ended up with the contrôle général. This was not correct procedure 
according to the Code of Criminal Procedure, but complainants had no way of knowing 
that this was how the system worked in reality.  
 
Nevertheless, within these limitations, the contrôle général functioned highly 
professionally and effectively as a disciplinary investigation body, with the production 
of reports which were mostly characterised by rigorous investigations of events. 
Unfortunately, as we can see again and again in the reports produced on Kien, the 
conclusions drawn by the contrôle général do not always seem logical in relation to 
the actual findings. This discrepancy can be explained by the dual function of these 
reports. On the one hand, their main purpose was to serve as a managerial tool to 
provide the police prefect with accurate and detailed insights into the performance and 
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possible failings of his personnel. On the other hand, the reports needed to reach 
conclusions justifying why the police prefect should not take further action beyond 
possibly suggesting some sort of internal disciplinary sanction.   
 
This again helps to explain some of the fundamental tensions within the Paris police 
force under Lépine. Undoubtedly, under his leadership, the Paris police had become 
a far more disciplined and professional corps, with younger generations having 
benefitted from compulsory school education, combined with the development of 
professional training after 1883.38 Although problems of impoliteness, rudeness, 
violence and alcoholism continued to be major causes of disciplinary action throughout 
the pre-First World War era,39 the increasingly tight discipline did much to improve 
standards of policing, particularly amongst lower ranking police personnel.40  However, 
it is clear that the investigations and reports from the contrôle général were not geared 
towards public relations and did not reflect popular understandings of what constituted 
unacceptable and transgressive acts by policemen. The micro-study of the 
investigations against Kien show that the reports from the contrôle général only very 
partially and inadequately addressed behavioural issues as perceived by members of 
the public, despite the recognition amongst police managers of the need to improve 
relations with the public. By treating all types of complaints as managerial issues of 
discipline, the police authorities missed an opportunity to engage with citizens’ 
concerns. The cases against Kien confirm what frustrated citizens had long 
complained about, namely facing something of a brick wall when complaining about 
unacceptable police behaviour. With no formal right to complain and no formal 
procedures to follow, aggrieved citizens had no way of knowing how their complaints 
17 
 
were being processed – if at all – and police authorities were under no obligation to 
inform them about the handling or outcome of the associated investigations.  
 
IV 
Among the many cases found in the special ‘complaints dossiers’, Commissaire Kien 
has the dubious honour of being the only police officer who became the object of 
several complaints – five in all – in addition to another twelve which were kept in his 
personnel file.41 The micro-study of Kien provides a rare opportunity to place his 
deviant behaviour in context with other senior police officers. Together the many 
unrelated complaints provide a detailed picture of a man with extremely unpleasant 
manners, complete disrespect for legal boundaries and due procedures, as well as 
serious problems of anger-management 
 
What is more significant, the micro-study reveals that his multiple professional failings 
were known and recognised by the contrôle général as early as 1897. These include 
lax professional standards, disregard for correct procedures and legal boundaries; 
evidence of sloppy book keeping and frequent absenteeism; rude and sometimes 
violent approach to members of the public. Added to this, came multiple allegations 
about drunkenness, gambling, socialising with known criminals as well as local pimps 
and madams. These problems  were repeated in other complaints during his later 
years as head of the police stations at Enfants-Rouges, Porte de Saint Denis and 
Ternes. This should have identified him early on as unsuited to a managerial post such 
as head of a police station, but it is only by 1916 that a note to that effect was entered 
on his professional record. Over two consecutive years in 1916 and 1917, an entry 
about professional qualities reveals the unambiguous assessments of Kien’s 
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leadership qualities. On the question ‘Does he have the ability to lead an important 
department’, the answer is categorically ‘No’. This is followed by the character 
assessment: ‘Intelligent, but insufficient moral authority’ (1916) and ‘Intelligent, but 
lacking in character and not outstanding’ (1917).42  
 
Problems were evident from early on in Kien’s role as station master in Asnière, a 
northern suburb of Paris. The first complaint received in1897 concerned his heavy-
handed intervention in a civil dispute between a lady and her wet-nurse over a sum of 
46 francs owed by the wet-nurse to her employer. The report from the contrôle général 
relates in detail how Kien overstepped his authority by going to the private address of 
the wet-nurse’s sister to seize cash in drawers and purses to meet the required sum 
of money.43 The report concludes that there was no need for the police to forcibly seize 
the money, and the employer had only asked for Commissaire Kien to act as a neutral 
deal-broker. In a letter from Lépine to Kien, the police prefect does not mince his 
words. He stated:  
 
‘I have read with regret the findings of the inquiry by the contrôle général 
…You have committed an arbitrary act, for which I cannot condemn you 
strongly enough (je ne saurais trop sévèrement vous blâmer)...I invite you 
to return, as quickly as possible, the sum of money to Mademoiselle Hué 
which she has been forced to hand over in unacceptable circumstances 
(dans des conditions inadmissibles).’44  
 
Two additional complaints were filed that year: one was addressed to the Police 
Prefect by a M. Schwartz about Kien’s rude and illegal handling of a dispute between 
him and a couple of former employees.45 This resulted in a very long report from the 
contrôle général, which ultimately exonerated Kien. Yet, while this investigation was 
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being conducted by the contrôle général, an article appeared in Le Journal which 
complained about Kien spending most of his time at the racing courses at Compiègne 
while Asnière was plagued by a wave of burglaries and violent attacks.46 This led to 
yet another investigation by the contrôle général. Over three months, Kien was the 
subject of a so-called ‘discrete inquiry’ which means that inspectors from the contrôle 
général were observing his comings and goings around the clock but without his 
knowledge. This was only the first of a series of similar undercover investigations that 
Kien was subjected to during his career. The final report of November 1898, although 
largely exonerating Kien for allegations of spending too much time at the race courses 
at Compiègne, reveals a rather unsettling picture of his lifestyle and professional 
conduct.47 Local residents, who had been interviewed by the investigators, described 
Kien as showing little interest in the issues they reported to the police. They found him 
grossier (rude) and lacking in a sense of duty, and seven named middle-class 
residents complained about being treated without due politeness. More specifically, 
the report mentions that Kien frequently visited the Café du Théâtre and Café Concert 
Colin, but no evidence that he ‘eut des relations avec des femmes’ (was having 
relationships with ʻwomen’) could be found, indicating nonetheless, that allegations of 
his engaging with prostitutes had been made. This is followed by a sentence which 
seems to imply that his previous conduct was not exactly irreproachable either: ‘He 
has just got married, and over the past month he appears to have moderated his 
lifestyle (avoir modifié son genre d’existence)’. The report concludes that the 
allegations about Kien’s lifestyle were ‘exaggerated’, although it does not contradict 
the substance of the allegations. It concludes that ‘Kien lacks a bit of manners and 
discipline; he is often absent and as a result neglects his duties (négligeant par suite 
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son service), but one may hope that being married will have a moderating effect on 
his habits.’48   
  
It did not. When Kien became commissiare at the police stations first at Enfants 
Rouges, then at St. Denis, he managed to acquire at least three more complaints, with 
at least one leading to disciplinary investigation.49 He then moved to the police station 
in Ternes in late 1905, where he remained until retirement in December 1918.50 These 
professional moves were the result of Kien applying for more attractive and prestigious 
posts, and not the result of managerial decisions that could be regarded as demotion.  
 
 The micro-study of Kien as a ‘problem officer’ also allows investigations into whether 
there was a wider public story to the individual complaints against him. Because of his 
unusual surname it is possible to track him in the press, and such press reports 
sometimes offer important clues about the wider context and the public reputation of 
individual police officers, despite the accounts often being flawed by errors and 
political bias. In the case of Kien, we do find that he acquired a certain public reputation 
in the course of his career. In the late 1890s, while commissaire in Asnière, at least 
two long newspaper articles appeared, both concerned with his sloppy professional 
conduct. As mentioned above, one article appeared in Le Journal which led to the first 
undercover investigation against him. Two years later Clemenceau’s Parisian daily 
L’Aurore51 published similar claims of sloppy professional conduct and unacceptable 
behaviour towards members of the public. Despite these articles, Kien does not 
appear as a ‘known’ entity beyond his local area, and over the following decade his 
name is only mentioned very occasionally. It was only by 1908-1909 that the Parisian 
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press began to notice him as a ‘problem officer’, when he was linked to a string of 
badly handled personal interventions.  
 
In July 1908 for example, Kien and two police officers entered a restaurant of dubious 
reputation with great fanfare to arrest some of the regular customers whom Kien 
suspected of Anarchist activities. He also sought to seize a red banner which Kien 
found politically offensive.52 Unfortunately, however, he had underestimated the 
readiness of these men to put up a fight, and Kien himself got a very bad beating 
before being eventually rescued by the two policemen under his command.53 This 
subsequently led to the arrest of two cap-drivers, Maurice Girard and another – 
variably referred to as ‘Jacques’ or ‘Jacquart’ – both accused of the attack on Kien. In 
the court case against the two cap-drivers running over January and February 1909, 
Girard and Jacquart were supported by the LDH, who maintained that the two were 
innocent.54 The defence claimed that the two cap-drivers had been arrested solely on 
the basis of testimony by the two police officers present, despite plenty of evidence 
that both Girard and Jacquart were far from the restaurant in question at the time of 
the attack.55 The case against Girard and Jacquart was eventually abandoned. 
However, Kien had become noticed by the Paris press nonetheless. 
 
Only a few months after this event, Kien’s unfortunate public image was further 
established by the mishandling of an investigation against a Mademoiselle Pellet (or 
Pelet), which became a cause célèbre of police incompetence and malpractice.56 The 
Pellet case even led Prime Minister Clemenceau to contact Lépine to complain about 
Kien. Clemenceau had become aware of the case through the LDH and extensive 
press reporting.57 Kien had transgressed his mandate by illegally interrogating a young 
22 
 
girl because a jealous wife suspected that her husband was having an affair with the 
teenager. Clemenceau requested Lépine to discipline Kien,58 but Lépine stood by his 
man, categorically denying that Kien was guilty of any error. According to Lépine, the 
mishandling of the Pellet case was all the fault of the examining magistrate.59 
Nevertheless, the letter that Lépine addressed to Kien employs a very different tone 
and shows the discrepancies between his unwillingness to admit errors to anyone 
outside the police, such as Clemenceau, and the tone he used internally towards his 
subordinates:  
 
‘The way you proceeded in this case was absolutely contrary to the powers 
accorded to you by law, and I ask you to take notice of the observations that 
I put to you concerning this cases, so that in the future your professional 
conduct adhere strictly to these principles’.60 
 
The micro-history of Kien’s career also allows us to follow the changing tides at the 
top management within the Paris police prefecture, which preceded his resignation in 
late 1918. Patience with Kien seems to have finally run out by June or July 1913. The 
changed attitude towards Kien from his superiors within the police was most likely a 
consequence of Lépine having retired earlier in 1913. The new man heading the Paris 
police, Célestin Hénnion, came in with an agenda of further tightening recruitment 
policy and internal discipline.61 Compared to the complaints previously raised against 
Kien, the 1913 case seemed rather banal. The director of a funeral parlour complained 
that Kien favoured his competitor by giving him all the business of burying the bodies 
of unidentified suicide cases.62 The allegations smacked of corruption and kick-backs, 
but the contrôle général placed most of the blame on Kien’s subordinate Inspecteur 
Chopineau. Kien nevertheless got a blâme sévère (serious red mark), and although 
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he had received a blâme sévère by Lépine on two previous occasions, this was the 
first time that the blâme sévère was registered in his personnel record. 
 
Although Kien remained in post, there seemed to be increased focus on his 
performance over the following years. The micro-history of the end of his career 
thereby provides some important insights into where the limits were drawn of 
acceptable professional conduct after Lépine’s retirement. It also indicates how Kien’s 
new superiors went about undermining his position. In the course of 1915 he was 
again the subject of a secret investigation by the contrôle général sparked by a 
complaint by a municipal councillor, M. Jousselin. The allegations were similar to those 
raised in 1898: That Commissaire Kien had neglected his duties at the police station 
while spending most of his time in cafés and restaurants of dubious reputation, often 
in company with characters known for their links to local criminals. As in 1898, the 
contrôle général describes the original allegations as exaggerated, although the report 
does not refute the claims that Kien spent much time in cafés and restaurants to the 
detriment of his duties at the police station. The report also insinuates that Kien was 
frequently drunk on duty, although no disciplinary action seemed to follow.63  
 
A final note from the police prefecture dated April 1918 implies that Kien had been the 
object of yet another investigation, although no report from the contrôle général has 
been included in the dossier. On this occasion, the allegations claimed that money 
was disappearing from the police station, and this time the CID (police judiciaire) 
became involved. Despite the severity of these allegations, a note from Police Prefect 
Raux to the police judiciaire briefly states that Kien’s police station overall functioned 
in a satisfactory manner, although the record keeping was found to be in disarray. 
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Raux further notices that Kien only checked the records two or three times a week 
(these were supposed to be updated every day), that financial accounts were not 
properly kept and that the handling of ‘found objects’ was unsafe and chaotic.64 These 
are the last documents in Kien’s personnel file. As soon as the First World War came 
to an end, Kien retired at the age of fifty-five – or was he requested to leave?  
 
V 
What makes the micro-history of Kien stand out is not only the frequency of complaints 
made against him, but also the relatively supportive reactions from within the police 
organisation, despite the chiefs being in full knowledge of the serious problems that 
had undoubtedly occurred. How was Kien allowed to continue his career despite these 
incessant complaints and investigations into professional misconduct across more 
than two decades? One aspect of this probably lies in the importance of patronage 
and personal support within the Paris police. Since the beginning of the Republican 
era, police critics and the popular press as well as memoirs from retired police officers 
were teeming with rumours about how corrupt or problematic policemen got off scot-
free because of their connections to people high up in the police hierarchy or to 
influential politicians. The extent to which rumours of personal connections between 
individual policemen and influential individuals shaped the functioning of the police is 
difficult to say. However, patronage did play a significant role in the recruitment and 
promotions within the police. Personal recommendation was a practice 
institutionalised to such an extent that the pre-printed form detailing the professional 
background and progress of all police personnel contained a special column for 
‘Recommendations’, which ran through the entire form, so that one could see who had 




The importance of recommendations is perhaps not surprising in the context of the 
nervousness of the early Third Republic, when the young republican regime was keen 
to fill the ranks of the Paris police with politically reliable personnel. Applicants for 
middle and higher posts in the police had to be recommended by someone within the 
higher police hierarchy or with known republican credentials.  Towards the turn of the 
century, as the Paris police force had become increasingly professionalised and 
promotions increasingly rested on professional merit, multiple attempts were made to 
do away with the recommendation system.65  
 
In the case of Kien, it is difficult to overlook patronage as a significant factor in his 
apparent invulnerability to complaints and disciplinary investigations, as he was going 
off the rails over a twenty-one-year period. In Kien’s career summary there is only one 
person indicated as providing him with recommendations, but it is an important 
individual nonetheless: Lucien-Célestin Mouquin, sous-directeur de la police 
municipale, and from 1903 director of the criminal investigation department of the Paris 
police.66 Mouquin was closely associated with Lépine and, as it happens, he was also 
Kien’s half-brother: Mouquin’s mother married ex-brigardier Kien when he was eight 
years old,67 and his brother Léon Alexandre was born eleven years his junior. By the 
time Mouquin recommended his half-brother to the police in 1888, he already held the 
position as commissaire and was well-embarked on his very successful career within 
the police. Like Kien, Mouquin also appears to be helped along by close family 
relations. An internal police investigation into Mouquin’s political sympathies and 
activities during the Paris Commune makes thinly veiled references to an ‘influential’ 
father, whose identity seems to be known to the police.68 So despite being the 
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illegitimate son of a domestic servant, Mouquin had received an education well beyond 
what could be expected for a young man of his particular social background. According 
to two internal investigations from the 1870s, Mouquin also had impeccable republican 
credentials, and even got away with testifying against the police prefecture in the 
famous 1879 process against the republican newspaper La Lanterne.69 Because of 
their different surnames, the close family connection between Kien and Mouquin may 
not have been obvious to the wider public. Nevertheless, at least one anonymous 
complaint from 1909 not only mentions this connection, but claims that Kien frequently 
boasted about being untouchable because he was the frère de lait (having the same 
mother) as Mouquin.70 If this anonymous denunciator knew about the connection 
between Kien and Mouquin, there are reasons to believe that Kien did not make any 
secret of it. Whether the connection to Mouquin was the key factor that sheltered Kien 
from serious disciplinary consequences from his professional failings is difficult to 
know, but it suggests that Kien himself believed it did. Mouquin retired in 1911, and 
with Lépine’s retirement in 1913, Kien’s position within the police became noticeably 
more difficult, eventually untenable.    
 
VI 
The career of Kien, as illuminated by this micro-history, gives a unique insight into 
police-public relations of the Belle Époque by providing evidence of the ambiguous 
attitude by police authorities towards the public. Police Prefect Lépine was keen on 
improving the public image of the police, but as this micro-study reveals he showed 
little interest in any meaningful engagement with the specific concerns expressed by 
members of the public. While the reports by the contrôle général provided him with 
detailed knowledge of poor behaviour and sloppy professional conduct, Lépine 
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systematically denied any wrong-doing in communications with critics from outside the 
police. This allowed a ‘problem officers’ like Kien to continue his career despite 
multiple disciplinary investigations and the occasional blâme sévère. 
 
Police critics often complained that Parisian police officers were beyond accountability 
to the public and to the law, but such concerns were brushed off by successive interior 
ministers. The micro-history of Kien provides evidence that the suspicions by police 
critics were not completely unjustified. 
 
Despite these frustrations, we see increasing assertiveness from aggrieved individuals 
and from civil liberties groups such as the LDH or socialist organisations and trade 
unions. Although this pressure from complainants increasingly placed police chiefs on 
the back foot, complainants and their supporters very rarely managed to break though 
the organisational defence of the police prefecture. 
 
The lack of transparency and repeated denial of wrong-doing, particularly in the face 
of overwhelming evidence to the contrary, seriously undermined public trust and police 
legitimacy. It also fanned the ‘black legend’ of the Paris police, and French police 
forces more generally. It gave some credibility to wild conspiracy theories claiming 
deep corruption and dark practices within French police forces, well beyond the 
mundane reality of everyday policing. This was the long-term legacy of Lépine’s cover-
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